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Review of The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker (Wiley-
Blackwell, Oxford, 2013) 
 
This book is the second of an ambitious trilogy on human nature, in which Peter Hacker 
continues to express his thoughts on a wide range of issues after a long career in philosophy. In 
volume 1, Hacker explored some of the most general ‘categorial’ concepts in terms of which we 
understand ourselves and our world, including substance, causation, agency, and person. In this 
volume, the concern narrows to the psychological with a focus on our cognitive and cogitative 
concepts (Volume 3 will focus on our ‘moral powers’ (xii)). 
Methodologically, Hacker is deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, concerning whom he is 
one of the world’s foremost scholars and standard-bearers. Accordingly, his aim in this book is 
conceptual clarification through paying close attention to how the terms expressing those 
concepts are used, for the sake of dissolving and deflating philosophical puzzles and ‘mysteries’, 
correcting error, unmasking nonsense, and vanquishing conceptual confusion. It is striking, 
however, how differently Hacker’s work reads from Wittgenstein’s. Whereas Wittgenstein wrote 
in an aphoristic style of piecemeal reflection, Hacker writes much more systematically, giving 
painstaking, extensive descriptions of aspects of our system of concepts, even using 
diagrammatic surveys and tables, offering ‘an overview of the conceptual landscape’ (438). 
Interestingly, Hacker shows that Wittgenstein wasn’t opposed to such work, citing his remark 
that ‘it is not impossible that such a [conceptual] map will sometime get constructed for the 
regions we are moving in’ (450). Hacker’s aim is to supply such a map. To this end, he engages 
in Strawsonian ‘connective analysis’, which ‘consists in describing the manifold logical 
connections between a given expression (and its cognates) and other expressions with which it is 
associated, or with which it is likely to be confounded’ (2).  
Most chapters explore a particular phenomenon, and follow a similar format: a historical 
introduction where appropriate, followed by detailed analysis of the relevant concept, followed 
by critiques of various philosophical theories in light of the analysis (often accompanied with 
explanations for why the theories are so tempting).   
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The first 3 chapters deal with consciousness, intentionality, and language, and whether 
they are marks of the mental (Hacker favours the third). Much ground is covered. Then a detailed 
discussion over three chapters ensues concerning knowledge, belief, and their relation. Of 
particular interest here was a nuanced discussion of know-how, after which Hacker concludes 
that sometimes knowing-how is reducible to knowing-that, but not always, and also a discussion 
of the relation between knowledge and belief, where he challenges the view that belief is always 
a component of knowledge. Hacker argues persuasively that beliefs fit into no general category: 
they are neither feelings, propositional attitudes, dispositions, mental states nor brain states, 
though they have affinities with some of these. I suspect, however, that his arguments will be 
found too inconvenient; philosophers often have need for some handy umbrella term with which 
to cover such things as beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. It’s likely that they will continue to use 
‘mental state’ or ‘attitude’ for this purpose, for want of a better word. 
 The next two chapters are on sensation and perception. Afterwards, two complex and 
stimulating chapters follow on the difficult topics of memory and thought. Here, Hacker traces 
many of the puzzles about memory to the, in his view, mistaken idea that remembering is a kind 
of experience. He also challenges, among other things, the idea that thinking is an activity, and 
the views that images, words, or concepts are the medium of thought. A chapter then follows on 
the imagination.     
The analyses are lucid, illuminating, precisely expressed, and are often surgically 
meticulous, though some elements here and there may be questioned. A love for the small detail 
is displayed, and many subtle and easily overlooked distinctions are made, such as the distinction 
between knowing that such-and-such and knowing the proposition that such-and-such, or 
between what an experience is like and what the thing experienced is like. Good use is made of 
effective analogies, and of the technique (used frequently by Ryle) of illuminating a concept by 
noting which modifiers (adjectives, adverbs etc.) apply to the relevant term and which don’t. The 
book is also quite polemical, with numerous major theories coming in for serious criticism.  
On the downside, Hacker sometimes interprets the theories he criticises uncharitably. For 
instance, he seems to interpret ‘condition’ in the truth-condition theory of meaning in a causal 
sense (133-134), rendering the view clearly absurd, when it is surely intended in a constitutive 
sense (i.e., the sense it takes when philosophers talk of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’). 
Moreover, when discussing ‘the thought that all perception is sensation involving’ (275), he 
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interprets ‘sensation’ in the ordinary sense, and easily disposes of this idea. But ‘sensation’ is 
surely intended in a special sense here. It is intended to mean that which is left over in perceptual 
experience when we abstract away cognition, or the subject’s understanding of or judgment 
about what he’s experiencing. It is the component of experience which we have simply in virtue 
of having functioning sense-organs which are being stimulated. If there is something fishy about 
this idea, Hacker doesn’t show what it is. Similar points may be made about his discussion of the 
causal theory of perception.  
For someone who makes frequent philosophical appeal to what we would/wouldn’t say, 
more attention could also have been given to issues of conversational implicature, as once or 
twice alternative Gricean explanations seemed available for the facts he adduces. For instance, 
when criticising the idea that knowledge entails belief, Hacker notes that often, when someone 
knows that p, it ‘would be wrong’ to report that he believes that p, since this would ‘clearly 
imply that he does not know’ it (244-245). Does that mean that knowledge and belief are 
distinct? That may depend on whether this implication is an entailment or a conversational 
implicature. Hacker dismisses the latter option without saying why, but a plausible Gricean 
explanation of the impropriety seems available, which assumes that knowledge is a kind of 
belief. As Grice noted, there is a conversational expectation that we make our contribution as 
informative as is required (the Maxim of Quantity)1. By hypothesis, if our subject knows that p 
then, ipso facto, he believes that p. But the report that he knows that p is more informative than 
the report that he believes that p (it says the latter plus more). Thus if it’s believed that I know all 
the relevant facts, and I only report that he believes that p, although true (by hypothesis), my 
audience will assume that he doesn’t know that p, since I should have said so if he does. Thus 
this issue merits further investigation, perhaps by applying Grice’s cancelability test etc.  
The book finishes with a long appendix on philosophical method and metaphilosophy, 
where Hacker expands on reflections started in volume 1, and makes some important points. He 
claims that to explicate our concepts, we must look at word usage, since concepts, he holds, are 
abstractions from the uses of words (384). He is at pains to emphasise, however, that this interest 
in words and concepts is no less an interest in the natures of things. Philosophical investigation 
‘elucidates a given concept by describing the use of the word that expresses that concept’ (459). 
Moreover, ‘The nature of something consists in those features without which it would not be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Harvard University Press, 1991, 26). 
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thing it is, and without which it would not fall under the concept that it does. Hence, to clarify a 
concept is to clarify the nature of what falls under it’ (453). Hacker explains (as Carnap did, 
though awkwardly2) that philosophical discussion can be carried out in different modes, though 
we often flit between them: the linguistic, conceptual, or the material/necessitarian mode (370 & 
446). To illustrate with a simple example, we may ask ‘What does “bachelor” mean?’, ‘What’s 
the concept of a bachelor?’, or ‘What’s a bachelor?’ But despite appearances, these questions are 
not about different things as such (word, concept, and thing respectively), since the answer to 
one gives the answer to the others. For if ‘bachelor’ means ‘unmarried man’, then the concept of 
a bachelor is the concept of an unmarried man, and furthermore, a bachelor is an unmarried man. 
And why should we privilege one mode over the others? The Linguistic Turn did not herald a 
change in subject-matter for philosophy, but only a clearer recognition that answering traditional 
philosophical questions articulated in the material mode requires paying attention to language.  
 But how are we to know what an expression’s proper use is? Hacker rejects two answers 
which have been offered in recent philosophy: that we should conduct surveys to find out what 
people say, and that we may rely on our own ‘intuitions’: ‘A competent speaker of the language 
is by definition someone who knows how to use a wide range of the common non-technical 
words of the language … he no more needs to consult others than a competent chess-player 
needs to ask others how to move the chess-pieces … he does not need to consult “intuitions” 
either’ (454). Or as he said in volume 1, we ‘at most need to be reminded of the familiar’3. 
The analogy between the rules of language and of chess has its limits. Chess rules are 
learned explicitly and give clear guidance for all the (formally limited) states of affairs which can 
arise in chess. The situation with the ‘rules’ of language is more complex. Consider the method–
of no small importance in philosophy–of using thought-experiments to investigate concepts by 
considering what we would say in some scenario, and note that the scenarios are often highly 
unusual or even physically/technically impossible. Consider a down-to-earth example: a Gettier 
case. Smith looks at his previously-reliable watch and comes to believe, at 2pm, that it’s 2pm. 
Little does he know that his watch stopped at 2am last night. Does Smith know that it’s 2pm? 
Here we can’t simply recall what is generally said in these and similar situations, because we 
may never have encountered them, and they are curiously different from what we are familiar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937). 
3 P.M.S. Hacker, Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (Blackwell 2007, 14). 
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with. We are left to judge for ourselves whether knowledge extends to this case. Given its 
novelty, we can’t simply recall what we actually say in such situations (‘marshal what one 
already knows’, 454), but must judge what we would or should say (the question of what 
determines these judgments is an important one). These judgments are then called ‘linguistic 
intuitions’. Is this so inappropriate? 
Nevertheless, Hacker’s conception of philosophy as a sui generis, a priori exercise in 
conceptual clarification restores to philosophy a dignity that has often seemed under threat from 
recent conceptions of it which blur the line between philosophy and science. But it also seems 
overly narrow. It is unclear, for instance, whether conceptual clarification is the panacea for all 
the problems and concerns which arise across sub-disciplines such as logic (formal and 
informal), philosophy of religion, science, and history, let alone ethics, political philosophy, 
philosophy of education, and Eastern philosophy, where thinkers are often concerned with 
normative and practical questions of what it’s right to do, how we should arrange society, how 
we should live, and what is of value.   
 Naturally enough, there is plenty of overlap between this book’s content and other works 
in Hacker’s large corpus, but also much that is new, with significant expansions on issues 
previously covered. After reading its chapters one is often left feeling as though the air has been 
cleared in what was a musty, stuffy room. It should be recommended to anyone interested in the 
topics it covers. 
 
Kevin Lynch 
	  
	  
